Gwadar: The Dragon and Rise of the Maulana

New Delhi: The month-long protests in Gwadar have provided a sharp relief to Pakistan’s weak grip on its domestic statements. Many underlying grievances have found expression in this popular movement by the poor fishing and farming community. The country’s development, local economic issues, anti-China sentiments, rising Islamic fundamentalism, and above all – a sense of humiliation at being treated as second-class citizens in one’s own country, being ignored by the Punjabi elite in the country’s development. But the displeasure of the Baloch, subject to the interests of the godless Chinese military-industrial complex and the Pakistani state’s narrow vision of its own identity.

While the immediate reasons may appear to be economic in nature, the nineteen demands of the protesters have more than meets the eye for them. The issue of ‘abusive check-posts’ in Gwadar points to the lax attitude of the Pakistani government towards its Chinese allies at every rung. In the name of security, a special zone created for Chinese workers, consultants and others of the like, all point to an unequal partnership.

Characteristic of a greater malaise affecting the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) as a whole, such restrictions, with many accommodations for Chinese personnel in Pakistan, only serve to isolate the local population, who are already suffering from a deep feeling. subordination

Over the course of its history, the Pakistani state has not only violently crushed expressions of Baloch identity, opting to quell dissent with an iron first rather than providing democratic outlets for differing views, it has now Baloch has been subjected to China in the second level of subjugation – China.

On the one hand, Baloch nationalism has been ruthlessly suppressed and Balochistan’s natural resources have held the interests of “mainstream” Pakistani interests hostage. Army and Punjabi “heartland” K. On the other hand, sugar is accorded an elevated status, with exemptions for the consumption of alcohol and pork – otherwise a capital offense in a country where lynchings on fabricated charges of blasphemy are common. The Sri Lankan factory manager Priyantha Diyavadana, who was brutally murdered in Sialkot earlier this month, may have escaped her horrific end by being Chinese. The hypocrisy is almost bizarre, and is not lost on Baloch.

Similarly, the demand for the closure of liquor shops in the area points to the deep religious guilt of the local residents. The grievance stems from “exceptions” for the Chinese at the expense of local customs and beliefs. Another demand relates to the lifting of sanctions on cross-border trade with Iran. Baloch live on both sides and both countries are wary of Baloch solidarity.

However, Pakistan has additional reasons to close people-to-people trade and cultural contacts. Long-term Chinese presence required a vast local population, preferably the economically marginalised. The fact that all of Gwadar’s projects are designed with Chinese preferences in mind, and regardless of local issues, indicates the importance of keeping Beijing in good humour, Islamabad, its own Baloch minority or theirs. Never mind the culture.

More ominously, the protest was led by local Jamaat-e-Islami leader Maulana Hidayat ur Rehman, who speaks of the collapse of the democratic space in Pakistan. An Islamist party, apparently at the forefront of local, economic grievances, is a harbinger of a treacherous path ahead. Islamists in Pakistan, more than Islamists elsewhere, are buoyed by the Taliban’s victory in neighboring Afghanistan. They dream of capturing a similar state in Pakistan. The state has been riding the Islamist tiger since its inception, and has been trying to support militant Islam without falling prey to it. But there are limits to how long the latter can be avoided.

Islamabad’s recent flip-flops with Tehreek-e-Labbaik, and their incessant fight-and-fight with Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), are clear manifestations of the much deeper fractures of society. Given the military’s iron grip on power, the lack of any democratic outlet for legitimate grievances, and the state’s deliberate cultivation of militant international Islam as a tool of foreign policy, the strengthening of Islamic parties in Pakistan has always been inevitable. .

The Jamaat’s leadership in the Gwadar protests, and the absence of Pakistan’s mainstream political parties, is detrimental not only to the CPEC and the Gwadar Project, but to the Pakistani state itself.

The Pakistan government has accepted the demands of the protesters for the time being and now there is peace there. However, a storm has been brewing in Balochistan for a long time, and it threatens to engulf the rest of Pakistan as well. Given the obvious implications of its billion-dollar investment in Pakistan, these events may have caused much panic in Beijing.

This year there have been several attacks targeting Chinese civilians in Pakistan and they are a cause of headache for the leadership of the Communist Party. However, the popular expression of anger in Gwadar complicates the situation even more. Individual terrorist attacks can still be written off as the handiwork of some extreme elements, but a massive movement involving thousands of people could lead to China questioning its reception in Pakistan.

Of course, it remains to be seen whether this will be the last straw. Maybe not. China has continuously spent economic and political capital on its trading friend, despite it being found on the brink of bankruptcy, sectarian conflict and coups. Now, however, the undercurrent of hatred for China in Pakistan’s increasingly radical society may eventually prompt Beijing to reconsider this romance.