Ever since October 8, Israel has been grappling with the appropriate response to the horrifying Hamas massacre the day prior – and in the seven months since, we have watched the nation struggle to articulate a clear strategy.
Initially, the government, led by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, was resolute in its objective to “destroy” and “eliminate” Hamas, championing this approach as the path to what it called “total victory.”
However, as the conflict has evolved, so too have the stated goals of the IDF, where officers began redefining the objective of the ground offensive, shifting focus toward achieving a new security reality in Gaza as opposed to complete victory.
The new definition involved dismantling Hamas from a well-structured “terror army” to a more disorganized insurgency.
The aim was no longer the total eradication of Hamas but rather a significant degradation of its military capabilities, manpower, and weaponry to a point where it could no longer exert control over Gaza or pose a substantial threat to the State of Israel.
Israeli soldiers operate in the Gaza Strip, February 20, 2024 (credit: IDF SPOKESPERSON’S UNIT)
What is Israel’s objective, and when will it be met?
In other words, Hamas would be weakened to the point that it would no longer have command-and-control systems and the ability to launch large-scale attacks, but would still be a threat that would need to be dealt with, similar to the way the IDF operates in the West Bank.
The crux of the issue, however, remains: When can Israel confidently declare that this objective has been met?
Quantifying the degradation of Hamas’s capabilities is inherently challenging, as both ministers and IDF officers openly acknowledge. Does victory occur when 50% of the fighting force is eliminated or only at 70% or more?
This question is worth keeping in mind as Israel contemplates its next major military move into Rafah, a strategic town in southern Gaza and the last Hamas stronghold in the Strip.
ON THE one hand, there is no question that an offensive is needed there.
Israel estimates that four Hamas battalions are there, numbering about 15,000 armed men, many of them having fled to the south of Gaza when the IDF started its ground offensive in the north six months ago.
Hostages are believed to be there; Yahya Sinwar and Mohammed Deif, the Hamas leaders, are likely in one of the tunnels there; and there are also tunnels along the border with Egypt – used by Hamas up until recently to smuggle in advanced weapons – that will also need to be neutralized.
All of this makes the military necessity clear, since as long as all of these fighters and infrastructure remain, it will be hard to prevent Hamas from once again posing a threat to southern Israel and from retaking control of the Gaza Strip once the war is officially over.
Just a few days ago, four soldiers were killed when mortars and rockets were launched from the Rafah area. Based on all of this, there is little doubt of the need for an operation in Rafah.
This of course would be the case if there were no hostages being held in Gaza, but sadly there are. The operation that Israel launched earlier this week into Rafah is, for the time being, limited and seems to be focused on pressuring the terrorist group to ease up its demands for a ceasefire.
This strategy indicates that, at least for now, securing the release of hostages remains a priority over broader military objectives.However, the potential for a larger-scale offensive raises several critical questions.
What if such an offensive, while successful in evacuating civilians and minimizing casualties, fails to completely dismantle the Hamas fighting force? If Israel, for example, succeeds in killing 8,000 Hamas fighters but 7,000 remain, the threat of Hamas reconstituting its military capabilities will also linger.
In addition, if key leaders like Sinwar and Deif remain at large and the hostages are not rescued, will such an operation even be considered a success?
THESE CONCERNS highlight the complex nature of modern warfare, where victories are elusive, and strategic goals must continually adapt to an evolving battlefield.
While there is no doubt – at least in my mind – that Rafah is a legitimate target that needs to be dealt with before the end of the war, these above questions need to be asked and answered before an operation is initiated.
Otherwise, in two or three months, Israel will find itself at the same place that it is now, wondering what to do next.
It is exactly this argument that the Americans have been making to their Israeli counterparts: If you are anyhow going to scale back the offensive at some point after a few weeks into a Rafah operation and continue to carry out counterinsurgency operations in a more isolated and pinpointed way, then why not start that now?
The Israeli public, still reeling from the events of October 7, deserves clarity and foresight from its leaders. The government’s reluctance to articulate a clear “day after” plan is often attributed to political sensitivities, particularly the contentious issue of engaging with the Palestinian Authority.
However, the stakes are too high now for ambiguity. Israelis, on the eve of Independence Day, deserve a comprehensive plan that outlines the path to security, detailing how it can be achieved.
Israel stands today at a strategic crossroads – does it enter Rafah and further risk the relationship with the United States where President Biden and Defense Secretary Austin have already declared they will withhold offensive weapons?
Or, does it stop, recalibrate and come up with an alternative?
Both options come with a steep price. Continuing into Rafah will widen the rift with the Americans. It might be short-lived but it might not.
And when there is a wider rift, other enemies – like Hezbollah – might get some ideas and try to exploit perceived weaknesses.
Not continuing into Rafah will also come at a price. Hamas will learn that Israel is controlled by the Americans and that all it has to do in the future is sacrifice its people and hold on for a while until the Americans slam the brakes on the IDF.
The stakes are high – and, as is often the case, Israel’s security hangs in the balance.
The writer is a senior fellow at the Jewish People Policy Institute (JPPI) and a former editor-in-chief of The Jerusalem Post.