Washington: After the fall of Afghanistan Taliban, many drew parallels with the situation in Vietnam half a century earlier in which the American war was ultimately doomed.
Images of a single helicopter rescuing careless people on the roof of a building in Saigon were flooded on social media, and similar scenes of desperation were seen after the Taliban captured Kabul.
an investigative journalist stephan simanowitz Tweeted pictures showing similarities between the US evacuation in Saigon in 1975 and those in Kabul in 2021.
“Photo 1: US diplomat evacuates US by helicopter from embassy as Taliban enters Kabul from all sides. Afghanistan (2021). Photo 2: US diplomat evacuates US via helicopter from embassy as PAVN and Vietnam occupied Saigon, Vietnam. (1975),” tweeted Stephen Simonowitz, an investigative journalist.
Andrew Wiest, The . writing in Washington Post Said it boasts a dramatic scene from half a century ago—which told a grim story of a wartime failure that once seemed unimaginable. In 1975 a lone helicopter sat precariously on the roof of Saigon, saving desperate strugglers as the war in Vietnam finally wrecked.
Most Americans were shocked by the speed of death of South Vietnam, who had closely followed the unfolding of the war, knew the end was coming.
They also knew the reason: the United States had not helped form a permanent South Vietnamese government and army, something that seems to have happened again in Afghanistan.
The same confusion was repeated in Afghanistan. America’s capacity-building efforts were always woefully inadequate. The United States continually sought shortcuts, such as training the “Afghan Local Police”, which Afghans more accurately called the militia. Unlike the training of the Afghan police, which was more resource-intensive and provided by contractors, training to these militias still relied on contractors, but less so, Foreign Policy pointed out.
Further, for the financial year 2021, US Congress Appropriated around USD 3 billion for Afghanistan’s combat forces, the lowest amount since fiscal 2008.
The US made the same mistake in Vietnam when it turned to building a South Vietnamese army that was a tiny carbon copy of itself—an army based on lavish use of firepower and endless supplies. In short, it would be the army of a prosperous nation.
The result was a military, called the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN), which won the battle largely on the strength of US-supplied firepower. But arvn It was never sufficiently connected with its people or nation, says Wiest, and it was not sustainable.
everyone from CIA As The Washington Post reports, General Creighton Abrams, the commander of the US military in South Vietnam in 1968, admitted to President Richard M. Nixon in 1969 to 1972 that South Vietnam was too fragile to survive without US military support.
As Nixon and National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger plotted for America’s exit from the war, Kissinger agreed with his boss’ assessment that it ruined South Vietnam, but said the country was a backwater and “no Will give a d-.n”
So it was that in 1973, after more than a decade of victories on the battlefield but no end to the war, the United States ended its war in Southeast Asia, Wiest said.
Ironically, this was repeated again in 2021, when current US President Joe Biden clarified that America’s “forever war” in Afghanistan would be completed by August 31, even after US intelligence predicted an Afghan military collapse. .
After helicopters left Saigon in 1975, America did its best to forget the lessons of our wrongful adventure in Southeast Asia. As The Washington Post reports, the military employed technology and maneuvering to win short, sharp wars, hoping that it would never again face a war like Vietnam.
But in Afghanistan, a war that began shortly after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States again faced a long war without a frontline.
In another terrifying conflict parallel to Vietnam, says Viest, few Americans deemed it in service of a nation that had little hold on its people and with an Afghan army of questionable ability and motivation.
Many battles were won, and an Afghan army was created that was our own reflection. But those victories and that army sat on top of a rare national structure full of corruption. Afghan politicians received little loyalty from the public, and the government fell within days without American support.
The lesson from Vietnam — and Afghanistan — is that the United States cannot win wars for countries whose weak governments are grappling with internal turmoil and external threats, Wiest says.
Images of a single helicopter rescuing careless people on the roof of a building in Saigon were flooded on social media, and similar scenes of desperation were seen after the Taliban captured Kabul.
an investigative journalist stephan simanowitz Tweeted pictures showing similarities between the US evacuation in Saigon in 1975 and those in Kabul in 2021.
“Photo 1: US diplomat evacuates US by helicopter from embassy as Taliban enters Kabul from all sides. Afghanistan (2021). Photo 2: US diplomat evacuates US via helicopter from embassy as PAVN and Vietnam occupied Saigon, Vietnam. (1975),” tweeted Stephen Simonowitz, an investigative journalist.
Andrew Wiest, The . writing in Washington Post Said it boasts a dramatic scene from half a century ago—which told a grim story of a wartime failure that once seemed unimaginable. In 1975 a lone helicopter sat precariously on the roof of Saigon, saving desperate strugglers as the war in Vietnam finally wrecked.
Most Americans were shocked by the speed of death of South Vietnam, who had closely followed the unfolding of the war, knew the end was coming.
They also knew the reason: the United States had not helped form a permanent South Vietnamese government and army, something that seems to have happened again in Afghanistan.
The same confusion was repeated in Afghanistan. America’s capacity-building efforts were always woefully inadequate. The United States continually sought shortcuts, such as training the “Afghan Local Police”, which Afghans more accurately called the militia. Unlike the training of the Afghan police, which was more resource-intensive and provided by contractors, training to these militias still relied on contractors, but less so, Foreign Policy pointed out.
Further, for the financial year 2021, US Congress Appropriated around USD 3 billion for Afghanistan’s combat forces, the lowest amount since fiscal 2008.
The US made the same mistake in Vietnam when it turned to building a South Vietnamese army that was a tiny carbon copy of itself—an army based on lavish use of firepower and endless supplies. In short, it would be the army of a prosperous nation.
The result was a military, called the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN), which won the battle largely on the strength of US-supplied firepower. But arvn It was never sufficiently connected with its people or nation, says Wiest, and it was not sustainable.
everyone from CIA As The Washington Post reports, General Creighton Abrams, the commander of the US military in South Vietnam in 1968, admitted to President Richard M. Nixon in 1969 to 1972 that South Vietnam was too fragile to survive without US military support.
As Nixon and National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger plotted for America’s exit from the war, Kissinger agreed with his boss’ assessment that it ruined South Vietnam, but said the country was a backwater and “no Will give a d-.n”
So it was that in 1973, after more than a decade of victories on the battlefield but no end to the war, the United States ended its war in Southeast Asia, Wiest said.
Ironically, this was repeated again in 2021, when current US President Joe Biden clarified that America’s “forever war” in Afghanistan would be completed by August 31, even after US intelligence predicted an Afghan military collapse. .
After helicopters left Saigon in 1975, America did its best to forget the lessons of our wrongful adventure in Southeast Asia. As The Washington Post reports, the military employed technology and maneuvering to win short, sharp wars, hoping that it would never again face a war like Vietnam.
But in Afghanistan, a war that began shortly after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States again faced a long war without a frontline.
In another terrifying conflict parallel to Vietnam, says Viest, few Americans deemed it in service of a nation that had little hold on its people and with an Afghan army of questionable ability and motivation.
Many battles were won, and an Afghan army was created that was our own reflection. But those victories and that army sat on top of a rare national structure full of corruption. Afghan politicians received little loyalty from the public, and the government fell within days without American support.
The lesson from Vietnam — and Afghanistan — is that the United States cannot win wars for countries whose weak governments are grappling with internal turmoil and external threats, Wiest says.
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