Opinion: A different Tawang clash
This time the Sino-Indian border conflict should be seen in the current geopolitical and strategic context.
Updated – 12:56 AM, Sat – 24 Dec 22
By Major General SB Asthana
Hyderabad: The China-India LAC faceoff on December 9 near Yangtse in Tawang sector is neither the first nor the last, but the skirmish resulting in injuries to soldiers on both sides is a reflection of rising aggression and violence by both sides to enforce their perception of the LAC. represents effort. ,
After the Galwan conflict in 2020, the Indian side is not surprised by the irresponsible behavior of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), which has nullified all old agreements for peace and tranquility. So Indian troops resolutely and firmly counter PLA attempt to close LAC near Yangtse Possibly to change the status quo.
While both sides immediately withdrew from the area, and held a flag meeting in accordance with the structured mechanism to defuse the situation, such repeated attempts are possible in the future and each time respond proactively, firmly and firmly. will be, as shown now.
What complicates the border dispute between China and India? The People’s Republic of China (PRC) refused to ratify the Simla Agreement of 1914, which was signed by a Chinese representative between British India and Tibet. The Indian position on the border generally follows the Johnson Line (1865) in Ladakh and the McMahon Line in the east. When Maharaja Hari Singh signed the Instrument of Accession, Aksai Chin was part of it; So it truly belonged to India. India should have forced China to accept the Simla Agreement before recognizing Tibet as part of the PRC. Therefore, there is no mutually agreed boundary treaty between independent India and the PRC.
China refuses to accept any treaties signed with Tibet or when it does not suit it, and selectively refers to them when it suits its interests, as it did during the Doklam crisis of 1890. Mentioned a treaty, which nevertheless seemed beneficial to him. The fact is that it was later replaced by several other treaties.
LAC and Complex Management
Both countries have their own perception LAC And in some areas, these notions overlap (eg Tawang, Pangong Tso). Since the LAC is not demarcated, the Chinese use the non-demarcation as an opportunity to pursue their ‘strategy of incremental encroachment’ by making new claims (Arunachal Pradesh) and building up troops/infrastructure until resisted Let’s follow it with the development of, and stop for a short time. Of struggle
An opposing action/build-up by Indian forces leads to a ‘faceoff/standoff’ each time. To avoid accidental triggers, both sides are resorting to measures short of live firing to prevent the other side from violating their perception of the LAC, which is increasingly turning into violent clashes.
current deadlock
To resolve this, transgressions, patrol clashes, face-offs and flag meetings have been a common feature and will continue till the LAC is demarcated. The current faceoff in Tawang is somewhat different from the earlier ones for several reasons if seen in the current geopolitical and strategic context as below:
* Chinese President Xi Jinping may try to stoke nationalist fervor with his aggressive nationalist stance by playing the victim card to address domestic discontent due to zero Covid policy, declining Chinese economy etc.
* Its aggressive stance in Ladakh and Taiwan and its pro-China approach make Xi favorable in consolidating his position as a strong leader to secure a third term. So he would like to continue it further.
* Unhappy with fastest growing economy, winter showdown could energize political debate in Democratic IndiaAnd the Indian government may be forced to deploy more troops during the winter in all areas, increasing the financial cost for India from control of the LAC.
* Attempt to test Indian response on eastern borders after India committed large amount of troops in Ladakh and Kashmir.
* The strategic and cultural relevance of Tawang is coming to the fore as the time for the nomination of the next Dalai Lama draws near. Tawang Monastery has been a center of cultural power and the birthplace of the 6th Dalai Lama.
* The Yangtse region has a difficult approach from the Indian side and is relatively more isolated in winter; So the Chinese could think of taking the risk of infiltrating there.
* China has enjoyed a huge asymmetry in infrastructure development on its side for too long and is not comfortable with Indian efforts to catch up in this regard. Hence the interruption of development activities along the borders is well suited to its design.
looking beyond
A change in mindset is required from being reactive to being proactive with additional intelligence, surveillance and offensive capability to demonstrate the ability to transgress into Chinese sensitive areas, the absence of which China There is no threat from India.
If the Chinese have passed a border defense law, India should also pass some legislation to facilitate vigorous border construction and expand plans under the Border Infrastructure Management Authority as close to the LAC as possible.
India must continue to build capabilities in all areas, including maritime, where Chinese vulnerable sea lines of communication may be at risk. In addition to the ongoing infrastructure development along the borders, there is a need to enhance the scope of the Border Area Management Programme.
It is recommended that along the LAC the States/UTs should allot concessional land to security forces like regional scouts, ITBP, Sashastra Seema Bal and families (on the concept of son of the soil) hailing from that area, Who are ready to settle in the villages thus created. , with its own perception of the LAC. This inclusive development will improve integration, besides substantiating our claims on the border to thwart the Chinese design of developing hundreds of new villages along the LAC.
Strategic partnership with like-minded democracies and collective naval posturing to create a multi-front position for China are efforts that must continue. There is a need for an alternative supply chain, trade and technology ecosystem independent of China which needs to build on some of the initial steps taken by the Quad countries.
(asthanrights.org)