The 21st century began China’s journey towards becoming an economic superpower with the concentration of global manufacturing in the country. By 2010, it ousted the US from the leadership position. China had arrived, it was part of the global economy.
The world believed that 21st century China, now a global manufacturing hub, would be more responsive and open to the international system. China’s soft power initiatives such as the Confucius Institute and sporting events such as the 2008 Beijing Olympics were acknowledged with confidence in the country’s potential.
But 22 years after his dream trip, China is back in the days of Chairman Mao under the leadership of its current President, Xi Jinping. And those soft power initiatives are believed to have been turned into another layer of its global espionage operation, as many security agencies allege.
Hub – United Front Work Department (UFWD)
With close to a century of existence as the originator of the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) ideology, the United Front Work Department (UFWD) is counted as a part of China’s intelligence network, with its “soft espionage” There is potential. According to the US government’s US-China Economic and Security Review Commission (USESRC), the UFWD works to co-opt and neutralize sources of potential opposition to the ruling CCP’s policies and authority.
Its mandate is to manage and disseminate the CCP narrative about China, both internally and externally, in one way or another. With its connection to the Chinese diaspora, along with an outward reach in almost all countries of the world, the organization is believed to have established itself as China’s center of non-traditional espionage.
An executive organ of the CCP Central Committee, the UFWD is believed to lure, co-opt, and recruit overseas ethnic Chinese for non-traditional intelligence tasks. One of Mao Zedong’s magic weapons, the unit is an umbrella of organizations with separate wings dedicated to influencing outside states and politicians.
Under Jinping, these “external influence operations” have gone to the next level. In addition to being accused of stealing technology from other countries, the UFWD is also allegedly responsible for China’s covert operations overseas, with many external security agencies describing it as the country’s second espionage front or its non-traditional espionage network overseas. defines in
Well embedded in Chinese embassies, UFWD operatives are considered middlemen for China’s hardcore espionage operations. Its targets among people in other countries include the Chinese diaspora, especially Chinese students and scholars, associates and students of Confucius Institutes, journalists, academic figures, influential people and industry leaders.
The scale of its operations can be understood from the fact that the UFWD is the main agency responsible for CCP propaganda, ideological subversion and religious persecution in Xinjiang and Tibet. The same umbrella agency is also responsible for Chinese subversive and influence activities in Taiwan and Hong Kong.
In January 2022, Britain’s MI5 warned about a Chinese agent, identified as Christine Li, infiltrating the British Parliament. Lee, the founder of a law firm in the UK, was allegedly involved in UFWD covert operations. He attempted to establish the CCP’s links with many current and aspiring British MPs through donations. In most cases the funds for charity were from foreign nationals based in China and Hong Kong.
According to an analysis published by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), the CCP uses the UFWD to infiltrate foreign state actors and political parties, industries, Chinese diaspora communities, and higher educational institutions. The report also states that the organization has recruited around 40,000 new employees under Jinping to further expand its global operations.
In February 2022, a Canadian court ruled that a UFWD organization in Canada – the Office of Overseas Chinese Affairs (OCAO) – was involved in espionage operations against the country. In September 2020, India ordered stricter checks for visa requests from the Chinese Association for International Understanding (CAIFU), which is a part of the UFWD.
Confucius Institute
The CCP government launched the Confucius Institutes in 2004 as an outreach program to inform the outside world about China’s culture, tradition and history. One of the main objectives of the program was to teach Mandarin overseas. Its growth in numbers was astonishing.
According to the Confucius Institute Headquarters, Confucius Institutes grew from one in 2004 to 443 in 2014, with 648 classrooms in 115 countries. There were 149 Confucius Institutes in European countries; 144 in the US, Canada and Latin America; 95 in Asian countries; 38 in African countries and 17 in Oceania countries.
The world went along with China’s words, allowing the country to share institutions and classrooms at universities and educational institutions abroad. According to its official website, in 2019 the number of institutions increased to 550 with 1,172 classes in 162 countries.
But its glory didn’t last long, as questions were raised about its functioning and its true purpose, with China costing the initiative about $10 billion annually, according to a report in Politico magazine.
The official website defines Confucius Institutes as “non-profit educational institutions jointly hosted by Chinese and foreign partners, with the aim of communicating Chinese, deepening international understanding of Chinese language and culture, and promoting China and the rest of the world.” To promote people-to-people exchanges between the Of the World”.
But critics feel it is just another propaganda arm of the CCP. It is also alleged that these institutions, being one of the playgrounds of the UFWD, are part of China’s non-traditional espionage networks abroad.
An analysis by the US Congress states that Confucius Institutes are controversial in nature, with little to no academic freedom and transparency. Another report by the Congressional Research Service highlights how they are a breeding ground for recruiting agents of influence and manipulating public opinion abroad. Reports also allege that they are involved in cyber espionage and theft of intellectual property.
US Congressman August Pfluger wrote in May 2023: ‘Confucius Institutes are used by the CCP to exploit the open, collaborative nature of American education and to conduct widespread industrial and military espionage inside the United States. Students and staff of these institutions infiltrate university campuses to steal intellectual property, intimidate Chinese dissidents, promote communist propaganda, and funnel information back to the People’s Liberation Army (PLA).
Senator Chuck Grassley warned all 74 colleges, universities and school districts with Confucius Institutes in 2020 about their role in China’s unconventional espionage. There were once 118 Confucius Institutes in the US but as of June 2021 the number has come down to 14.
The US State Department designated Confucius Institutes as foreign missions in August 2020, saying: “The obscurity of this organization and its state-directed nature are the driving reasons behind this designation.”
The past few years have seen a slowdown in the sudden growth of Confucius Institutes, with growing hostility towards their work culture not only in the US but also in other countries. Finland closed its Confucius Institutes over allegations of censorship and espionage.
Security was a major concern behind Sweden’s close move as well. After this Norway and then Denmark closed all their Confucius Institutes except one.
British Prime Minister Rishi Sunak calls China the biggest threat to the world and wants to ban all 30 Confucius Institutes in Britain. He has accused China of infiltrating educational institutions and stealing technology.
India reviewed the operations of Confucius Institutes in 2020 following an alert by security agencies. The agencies were concerned about the growing Chinese influence in India’s higher educational institutions. In April 2022, Foreign Contribution (Regulation) Act or FCRA approval was made mandatory for tie-ups of Confucius Institutes.
chains – eyes and ears
In a globally connected world, China is the largest lender, producer and exporter. The country has embassies around the world. Its Confucius Institutes are spread across continents and countries. According to a UNESCO report, its diaspora is the third largest in the world.
This means that the UFWD has potential non-traditional spies around the world. The main focus is to target the grapevines, be it bureaucratic, educational or industrial. The operators of China’s non-traditional espionage networks are believed to develop ecosystems to initiate channels of communication with their targets.
Once they find some important and sensitive grapevine, they pass it on to the next level of intelligence. They act as the eyes and ears of China’s hardline espionage operations, adding significant value to the existing system.
Chinese students abroad main target
Chinese students abroad have been implicated in espionage operations. In 2005, a Chinese student network was identified in Belgium as a front for economic espionage.
Another USESRC analysis on UFWD states that spies stationed in Chinese embassies are in direct contact with Chinese students working as UFWD operatives. Most of the 200 Uighur students detained in Cairo, Egypt in 2017 were deported to China. This was again done with the help of a Chinese student who was the head of the Chinese Students Union in the city.
It has also been alleged that most of these Chinese student bodies are directly funded by their government or embassies. In 2018, Foreign Policy reported that the Chinese Student Association of Georgetown University received about half of its funding from the CCP government in China.
A point may be raised that the money may be of a generic nature but its use in non-conventional espionage operations cannot be ruled out. In September 2020, the US revoked 1,000 Chinese student visas after it was found that they had links with the Chinese military and were also involved in some espionage operations.
These non-traditional Chinese spies also target media network people overseas. In one of their many modus operandi, it emerged that they posed as professionals affiliated with high-profile consulting or policy groups based in the US or some other Western country. They invite applications as a first step to know the knowledge level of the potential recruit.
Their first invitation is about a full-time position. The second invitation mail is about turning that full time position into a part time job. The logic is that the agency will initially look after him for a period of time before making him a full-time consultant.
Tapped potential recruiters are bright media persons with connections. Part-time work means third-party payment. Here, they use the co-opted Chinese diaspora to pay these part-time recruits in exchange for grapes of importance. His focus is mainly on the political, defense and economic sectors.
The mettle of security needs to be further strengthened to prevent and prevent leakage of information through these non-traditional espionage channels. The situation becomes more difficult when the person believed to be part of China’s non-traditional espionage operations is sitting abroad and digitally connected to the target.
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