A phenomenon of competing narratives that began nearly three decades ago in the mid-1980s, still defines politics in Uttar Pradesh, India’s most populous and politically important state.
Governments have come and gone, but the politics of Hindutva versus caste identity continues to define the core of politics and electoral outcomes. This is still the case despite the ruling BJP’s election pitch of growth and “double engine growth”.
Commonly referred to as the Kamandal versus Mandal narrative, the two have been on opposite ends of the political spectrum, but over the past decade, the BJP has learned the trick of synthesizing the two. It is this synthesis that has largely been behind its total dominance in electoral competitions in the state since the 2014 general elections.
Now the question is, can BJP still keep Kamandal and Mandal in harmony? Uttar Pradesh Election 2022, or is there a crack in this consolidation? And if there are indeed some cracks, could they be deep enough to challenge the saffron dominance that has been in existence for almost a decade now?
peek into the past
During the heyday of the Ram Mandir movement in the mid-80s and early 90s, when the BJP and the RSS struggled to expand their political and ideological footprint in the Hindi heartland of Uttar Pradesh, the challenge was rising caste. Came from politics
It was also a period of new Dalit claims in the form of late Kanshi Ram and his Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP). Parallel to this was the new wave of backward caste claims that emerged aggressively with the VP Singh government announcing the implementation of the Mandal Commission recommendations in 1990.
While Kanshi Ram’s BSP was seen as a natural proponent of rising Dalit consciousness and his desire for greater participation in political power, Mandal’s politics was also seen as a step to expand the Hindutva narrative. After all, the Mandal Commission’s recommendations to give 27 per cent reservation to backward castes in educational institutions and government jobs were lying with the central government since 1980.
The pro-Mandal and anti-Mandal sentiments that emerged thereafter saw the rise of a new politics in states like Uttar Pradesh and Bihar. Leaders like Mulayam Singh Yadav in UP and Lalu Prasad Yadav in Bihar became the new poster boys of Indian politics.
The BJP and the Sangh Parivar got stuck. Despite a spectacular political and social mobilization for the Ram Mandir movement, the saffron camp struggled to cope with the new politics. The desired ‘Hindu society’ was now deeply fragmented on the basis of caste.
As the backward castes looked at the other side, the BJP failed to return to power in Uttar Pradesh in the December 1992 assembly elections held after the demolition of the Babri Masjid in Ayodhya.
Dalits, on the other hand, have never been close to the ideology of the RSS. Never been with Jan Sangh, he also did not show warmth towards BJP. For them, the new glue was the BSP, the party that called itself the “movement”. At the loss was the Congress, for which Dalits, Brahmins and Muslims have been a support base for decades since independence.
Mandal was to Modi
The politics that came with the Mandal era was largely the same till 2013, which may mark the beginning of the Narendra Modi era. Politics in Uttar Pradesh was also on the verge of redefining, before the then Chief Minister of Gujarat became the BJP’s choice for prime minister before the 2014 general elections.
Modi not only “promised”acche din“For the unemployment- and corruption-weary masses, but in Uttar Pradesh, where OBCs constitute about 50% of the population, he was also a much needed backward face. No wonder, in the run-up to the 2014 elections, Modi mentioned his caste from the stage.
With Modi’s personal charisma as well as the organizational restructuring that took place in the UP BJP, there was an increasing reach for non-upper castes, especially non-Yadav OBCs and non-Jatav Dalits.
Attempts were made to strengthen those castes which were not seen as strength behind any adversary. So if Yadavs were seen strongly with SP in OBCs, BJP focused on non-Yadav OBCs. Similarly, a lot of effort was made to woo the non-Jatav Dalits, as the Jatavs were firmly with the BSP.
The election of non-Yadav OBC face Keshav Prasad Maurya as the party’s state president ahead of the 2017 assembly elections was a testimony to this effort. Maurya had won the Phulpur Lok Sabha seat in 2014 on a BJP ticket. The fact that he was brought in in place of a Brahmin, Laxmikant Vajpayee, was a testament to the pragmatism of the BJP in adjusting with the dynamics of the Mandal.
The BJP’s new adjustment to the realities of caste led by Prime Minister Narendra Modi and then national president Amit Shah resulted in 2017. The BJP returned to power in the state, winning 322 seats with allies, which originally consisted of backward classes. Caste-based parties like Apna Dal and Bharatiya Samaj Party led by Om Prakash Rajbhar.
Yogi’s election as Chief Minister
The first BJP government in UP, which was also a majority government, was formed in 1991 and was led by Hindutva icon and Lodhi OBC face Kalyan Singh. The RSS then led the way by describing him as a “natural leader”. Clearly, the Sangh had tried to counter the growing sentiments of Mandal with its projection of a backward leadership.
Twenty-five years later, when the BJP again came to power with an absolute majority, there was a big surprise when the flamboyant upper caste Kshatriyas, Yogi AdityanathCM was elected. The election did not go unopposed as Maurya’s ambition to become chief minister was no secret.
Five years later, as the BJP prepares to contest again under the leadership of Modi and Yogi, the caste fault-lines are not insignificant.
There is no denying the fact that the so-called discontent of the non-Yadav OBCs, commonly referred to as the Most Backward Classes, has been the subject of constant discussion throughout the Yogi regime.
For now, the BJP is confident that with Modi’s larger brand image, Yogi’s Hindutva image is coupled with a “double engine”. sarkar“Vikas Katha will continue to remove caste divides. The caste ruckus will be stopped due to the current belief in Brand Modi and any concern about upper caste as CM will be influenced by the strong Hindu narrative of Brand Yogi.
But these calculations are easier said than done. The opposition expects from the fact that there has been a major OBC movement against the BJP. The Jat-based RLD is now firmly with the Samajwadi Party in the west, and so is the former BJP ally Om Prakash Rajbhar in the east. Ram Achal Rajbhar and Lalji Verma, who were once the pillars of BSP’s strength, are now taking this cycle forward.
Buoyed by renewed support and eager to play on caste realities, SP chief Akhilesh Yadav is working hard to break the conservative image of his party’s MY (Muslim-Yadav) base. The alliance with smaller parties reflects his insistence on expanding the caste base.
Much about the Kamandal vs Mandal phenomenon will also be defined by how the BSP and Congress do in elections. Akhilesh Yadav feels that a resurgent Congress can influence the BJP’s vote bank by attracting a section of upper caste and urban voters. The challenge for the BSP will be to maintain its hold on the Jatav Dalit vote bank. A division that can benefit BJP.
Past results have shown that a party that receives about 30% of the vote may be in power. In 2007 and 2012, Mayawati and Akhilesh Yadav formed majority governments respectively with around 30% vote share.
In 2017, riding solely on the Mandal-Kamandal synthesis, the BJP won the elections with nearly 40% vote share. It will be interesting to see whether the BJP can maintain the momentum or not.
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